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Abstract Trade exhibits two contrasting effects on income inequality in developing 
countries (DCs). On the one hand, trade openness benefits unskilled labor in 
preference to skilled labor and capital (the Stolper–Samuelson effect). On the other 
hand, trade openness increases the demand for skilled (rather than unskilled) labor 
inputs (the skill premium effect). Recent studies that provide stronger support for the 
skill premium model have focused on wage inequality or have chosen higher-income 
DCs. We test the effect of export growth on income inequality for 70 lower income 
DCs and 36 higher-income DCs, using an unbalanced panel dataset for the 
1971–2012 period. The results show that the export/GDP ratio has a negative effect 
on income inequality for lower-income DCs, but no significant effect was found for 
higher-income DCs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental, 
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute 
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.  
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and 
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).  Publication does 
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views 
expressed within. 
 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO 
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI 
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN 
 
©2017 by Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO 
No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the 
IDE-JETRO. 
1 
 
 
Introduction 
Trade exhibits two contrasting effects on income inequality in developing countries. On the one hand, 
trade openness benefits unskilled labor in preference to unskilled labor and capital because 
developing countries specialize in unskilled labor-intensive goods, which leads to less inequality (the 
Stolper–Samuelson effect). On the other hand, trade openness increases the demand for skilled labor 
inputs in preference to unskilled inputs, which promotes inequality (the so-called skill premium effect). 
Although more recent studies seem to favor the skill premium model over the Stolper–Samuelson 
model, the evidence for the skill premium model depends strongly on several factors. First, in studies 
of the effect, the dependent variable is typically wage inequality, rather than income inequality. 
Second, even when income inequality is the dependent variable, the model fits only developing 
countries (DCs) with relatively higher incomes.  
We argue that the Stolper–Samuelson model is well suited to lower-income DCs for two reasons. 
First, export growth results in additional income by creating jobs that are filled by previously 
unemployed or underemployed workers. Since the proportion of the labor force that is unemployed or 
underemployed is larger in lower-income DCs relative to higher-income DCs, the effect of export 
growth on unskilled job creation is expected to be enhanced in lower-income DCs. Second, the skill 
premium effect on wage inequality is weaker in lower-income DCs because there is little scope for 
skill intensification. The high rate of unemployment/underemployment in lower-income DCs also 
prevents increased demand for skilled labor from driving wages up. Thus, the strong effect of exports 
on creating unskilled jobs and the weak skill premium effect together contribute to a reduction in 
income inequality in lower-income DCs. 
We test the effect of the export/GDP ratio (as a marker of trade openness) on income inequality for 
lower-income DCs (n = 70) and higher-income DCs (n = 36), using an unbalanced panel dataset for the 
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1971–2012 period. Data for this analysis were compiled from the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID) and the World Development Indicators Database. The next section 
discusses the conceptual and empirical bases of our argument. The third section elaborates on the 
dataset and panel design. The fourth section presents the major findings of the panel analysis. The final 
section interprets the findings and discusses their implications.  
 
Export and Income Inequality in Lower Income Developing Countries 
Previous research on trade openness and income inequality has presented competing theories and 
provided mixed evidence (Reuveny and Li 2003, Lee, Nielsen, and Alderson 2007, Meschi and 
Vivarelli 2009, Ha 2012, Franco and Gerussi 2013, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007, Milanovic 2005). On 
the one hand, the Stolper–Samuelson model predicts that trade openness will benefit unskilled labor, 
which is abundant in DCs, more than it will benefit unskilled labor and capital. If so, this will result in 
lower inequality. The Stolper–Samuelson model has been criticized for adopting narrow assumptions 
and because evidence of labor reallocations across sectors that benefit or suffer from trade 
liberalization has been scarce (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007, 58-61). On the other hand, the skill 
premium model claims that trade openness bolsters demand for skilled labor, which is used to produce 
exports, and thus widens wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor (Feenstra and Hanson 
1996, Wood 1997). While more recent studies offer evidence for the skill premium model (Meschi and 
Vivarelli 2009, Ha 2012, Franco and Gerussi 2013, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007), most evidence is for 
wage inequality (Harrison, McLaren, and McMillan 2011), which fails to fully account for 
unemployed/underemployed workers, rather than overall income inequality.  
Even in studies that explain income inequality (in contrast with wage inequality) in terms of the 
skill-premium model, the results depend strongly on the specific circumstances. In some studies, 
initial research did not find any significant effect of trade openness (or export ratio) on income 
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inequality; significance was obtained only after trade was decomposed into exports and imports and 
by destination or origin. Moreover, those results applied to only middle-income countries, and the 
effects were not found for lower-income countries (Meschi and Vivarelli 2009, Franco and Gerussi 
2013). In a similar vein, Lin and Fu (2016) demonstrated that the Stolper–Samuelson model (resp., the 
skill premium model) could be applied to autocracies (resp., democracies) because of the 
intensiveness of primary (resp., intermediate) goods in export. 
Prior research has thus demonstrated that export growth increases wage inequality in 
middle-income countries (and higher-income DCs) through an intensification of the skill premium. 
The finding that the skill premium model is better suited to higher-income DCs than to lower-income 
DCs is consistent with the model’s logic. However, this research has left unanswered the question of 
whether the Stolper–Samuelson model better explains income inequality in lower-income DCs. There 
are two reasons to suspect that trade openness (in general) and export share of GDP (in particular) 
contribute to income equality in lower-income DCs.  
First, export growth results in previously unemployed or underemployed workers newly receiving 
income. Trade openness has been found to contribute to job creation (Winters, McCulloch, and 
McKay 2004, Hasan et al. 2012), albeit mildly (Winters, McCulloch, and McKay 2004, 98-99).1 In 
DCs, the job market is characterized by the existence of a huge informal sector in which people are 
underemployed, i.e., not formally employed but working on an irregular basis for low wages. The 
surplus unskilled labor that is found in the informal sector stems from a large labor force in 
agriculture in lower-income rather than higher-income DCs. The effect of export growth on unskilled 
job creation is thus expected to be more pronounced in lower-income DCs. Second, the skill premium 
effect on wage inequality is weaker in lower-income DCs; the results of the previous studies imply this. 
This occurs because when the unemployment/underemployment rate is high, as is the case in 
lower-income DCs, an increase in demand for skilled labor is less prone to pushing up wages. Thus, 
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for lower-income DCs, a stronger effect of export on unskilled job creation and a weaker effect of the 
skill premium on wage inequality together contribute to a reduction in income inequality. As Figure 1 
indicates, export growth creates jobs for previously unemployed/underemployed workers and thereby 
reduces income inequality; the magnitude of this effect is the size of Area A. A higher skill premium 
increases income inequality by the size of Area B, but its size relative to that of Area A is smaller for 
lower-income DCs than for higher-income DCs. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Although there is scant evidence on the effect of import growth on income inequality, the relevant 
literature indicates that increasing import levels widens inequality. The import sector in DCs is mainly 
intermediate and capital goods. An increase in imports may therefore favor skilled labor, which can 
make use of such goods, over unskilled labor (Griliches 1969, Krusell et al. 2000, Duffy, Papageorgiou, 
and Perez-Sebastian 2004). At the same time, however, import growth in DCs is often driven by export 
growth because the latter requires more intermediate and capital goods to be imported from developed 
countries. It is therefore necessary to properly attribute some of the import growth to export growth. 
The overall negative effect of the import ratio on income inequality can be delineated by including 
both exports and imports in the estimation model.  
 
Research Design 
Data and samples 
This study separately tests the effect of the export/GDP ratio on income inequality for higher- and 
lower -income DCs using an unbalanced panel dataset for the 1971–2012 period compiled from the 
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Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) and the World Development Indicators 
Database. DCs were defined as countries whose nominal GDP per capita as of 2010 was below 
$25,000 (N = 106).2 The DCs were then divided into (1) higher-income DCs, whose nominal GDP per 
capita was $5,000 (n = 36) or above, and (2) lower-income DCs whose, nominal GDP per capita was 
below $5,000 (n = 70). See Table 1 for the sample of countries. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Panel design 
The panel analysis adopted a fixed effects (FE) model with a lagged dependent variable (LDV) due to 
its better match with the current dataset relative to other models.3 Alternatives to the FE model, such 
as a random effects (RE) model or panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) estimation, were unsuitable 
due to the dataset’s properties. Specifically, an RE model was not chosen because the Hausman test 
rejected the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient RE estimator are the same as 
those estimated by the consistent FE estimator. PCSE estimation was not chosen because, although it 
is appropriate for a panel with a limited number of cross-sections over a long time period, it is 
unsuitable for a panel having more cross-sections than time points (Beck and Katz 1995), which is the 
case here. 
The FE model mitigates the potential problem of selection bias arising from unbalanced panels such 
as this dataset (here, observations per country differ in number) because the country-specific intercept, 
which represents unobserved effects, captures the idiosyncratic likelihood of missing observations 
(Wooldridge 2013, 473-4). Furthermore, the FE model can accommodate using an LDV, which has 
three appealing properties in the context of the current research. First, a model with an LDV is 
6 
 
appropriate for situations where the effect of a change in an independent variable is distributed over 
time. Second, although the inclusion of an LDV makes the FE (and the ordinary least squares) 
estimator inconsistent, the FE (but not the ordinary least squares) estimator becomes consistent when 
T becomes large. An appropriate value for T is 20 or more, according to Beck and Katz (2011, 342), 
while Baltagi (2008, 148) cites an example of relatively consistent estimators when T reaches 30.4 
The mean number of observations per country in the dataset is 14.7 for the lower-income DCs and 
22.2 for the higher-income DCs, and so potential estimator inconsistency should be at an acceptable 
level. 5  Third, misspecification in the LDV model would lead to underestimation, rather than 
overestimation, of regression coefficients (Beck and Katz 2011, 336). 6  This tendency for 
underestimation reduces the chance of erroneously asserting significant impacts for the variables of 
interest.  
In sum, the FE model with an LDV has three major advantages over other models. First, it enables 
addressing the question of whether socioeconomic and political changes account for incremental 
change in each country’s income distribution. Second, it controls for country-specific conditions, such 
as colonial experiences, and path dependence more generally; it also reduces the selection bias 
inherent in unbalanced panels. These features of the model well serve the major interest of this study, 
which is to determine the impact of political and economic reform on income equality in emerging 
democracies and not to undertake a comparison of income equality among countries at different levels 
of democracy. Third, taking conservative estimates of variable coefficients diminishes the chance of a 
false claim of new evidence. 
 
The FE model with a LDV used here takes the following form: 
 
DVi,t = α + β1 (DVi,t-1) + β2 (IV1i,t-1) +β3 (IV2i,t-1) +... + βk (IVhi,t-1) + υi +γt + εi,t  
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where DVi,t is a measure of the dependent variable in country i in year t, DVi,t-1 is an LDV, IV1i,t-1, 
IV2i,t-1, ... IVhi,t-1 are h independent variables in country i in year t-1, α is the intercept, βk are k 
coefficients to be estimated, υi are fixed group effects, γt are fixed time effects, and εi,t is a 
white-noise error term.  
 
Variables 
Table 2 presents the variables and their data sources. All independent variables were lagged by one 
year. The dependent variable, the after-tax Gini coefficient, is derived from the SWIID compiled by 
Solt (2009), who estimated before-tax (“market”) and after-tax (“net”) Gini coefficients as well as 
changes in the Gini coefficient after taxation (“redistribution”) using the World Income Inequality 
Database (UNU-WIDER 2008), the Luxemburg Income Study Database (LIS 2008), and more recent 
country-specific databases. In this study, the estimated before-tax Gini coefficient and the estimated 
redistribution were also used as alternative dependent variables; however, the estimated after-tax Gini 
coefficient produced the most substantive results. The data source for the independent variables is the 
World Development Indicator Dataset. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The variable of interest is the export/GDP ratio. Although trade openness can be used instead, the 
export ratio is more relevant to the core argument of both the Stolper–Samuelson and skill premium 
models discussed above. In addition to the export ratio, the following variables were used as correlates 
of income inequality (expected direction of effect shown in parentheses, + indicates widening): 
8 
 
import/GDP ratio (+), the logarithm of the real GDP per capita (+) and its square (−), secondary school 
enrollment (−), the young population (−), the elderly population (+), urban population (−), and net 
inflow of FDI (+). Year dummies control for concurrent shocks (e.g., a world economic crisis) and 
long-term trends (e.g., growth of neo-liberalism).  
  Among these variables, the logarithm of the real GDP per capita (+) and its square (−) deserve 
elaboration. Kuznets (1955) argued that economic development has an inverted-U curve effect on 
income inequality, but there have been few panel studies to support his theory; most of the supporting 
evidence is derived from cross-sectional studies prone to unobserved country-specific effects [see the 
review by Tam (2008)]7. The net inflow of FDI, accompanied by technological transfer, is expected to 
increase demand for skilled labor and thereby to widen wage disparity, according to the skill premium 
model (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007, Ha 2012).  
Before testing the main hypothesis, we examine the assumption that an increase in export/GDP ratio 
enhances employment opportunities in DCs. Drawing on the previous argument, employment 
opportunities were separately measured by unemployment and underemployment. Unemployment is 
conventionally defined as the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and 
seeking employment. Unemployment thus defined, however, does not fully represent employment 
opportunities across DCs at different levels of development. In some DCs that have unemployment 
benefits and other types of social safety nets, people can afford to remain unemployed. In other DCs 
that lack such social protection mechanisms, people without jobs prefer to work even informally on 
an irregular basis for low wages. 8 Such situations encourage underemployment as disguised 
unemployment in the informal economy. The subsample mean of the panel mean unemployment 
calculated from the dataset is almost the same for the higher-income DC subsample (10.0) and the 
lower-income subsample (10.6). This suggests that unemployment statistics undervalue the gravity 
of job situations in lower-income DCs. 
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Underemployment was captured by sector dualism, an indicator of economic informality which is 
calculated as the absolute difference between the percentage of the labor force in agriculture and 
agriculture as a share of GDP (Huber et al. 2006, Lee, Nielsen, and Alderson 2007, Nielsen et al. 1995). 
In essence, it reflects the level of labor redundancy, i.e., how much labor is used to produce value 
added in the agricultural sector, relative to that in the nonagricultural sector.9 The absolute value is 
used to ensure that the value would be positive even if the agricultural sector was more productive 
than the nonagricultural sector (Nielsen et al. 1995, 680). The labor force in the agriculture is the 
major source of underemployed unskilled labor in the nonagricultural sector. The mean income 
difference between the nonagricultural and agricultural sectors, mirrored by sector dualism, pulls the 
surplus unskilled labor in agriculture into the nonagricultural informal sector; the greater the sector 
dualism, the larger the underemployment. The subsample mean of the panel mean sector dualism is 
much higher in the lower-income DCs (26.3) than in the higher-income DCs (9.7).  
 
Results 
Exports and job creation 
The FE model with an LDV estimated the impact of exports on unemployment and underemployment. 
Because the dependent variables are direct observation (unlike income inequality, which is 
estimated), multiple imputations were not used. Table 3 shows the results of estimation of 
unemployment. The export/GDP ratio has a negative effect on unemployment for higher-income but 
not for lower-income DCs. One might attribute the difference to the smaller size of the lower-income 
DC subsample due to a significant lack of unemployment data; the coefficient signs of the 
export/GDP ratio are the same for the higher- and lower-income DC subsamples. It is more likely, 
however, that unemployment statistics do not sufficiently represent job opportunities in 
lower-income DCs. Even in higher-income DCs, other independent variables show that the 
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unemployment variable partly reflects the level of social welfare. The higher the GDP per capita 
logged, the higher the unemployment. The school enrollment ratio also positively affects 
unemployment indicating that skilled workers may voluntarily remain unemployed while seeking 
better jobs.  
The results for underemployment, as captured by sector dualism, are presented in Table 4. The 
export/GDP ratio and import/GDP ratio variables have negative and positive effects, respectively, on 
sector dualism at significant levels for lower-income DCs; for higher-income DCs, they do not have 
any significant effects. The secondary school enrollment ratio and urban population also improve 
informal sector employment opportunities by reducing sector dualism in accordance with the 
theoretical expectations. These findings imply that an increase in export reduces labor redundancy in 
the informal sector and enhances its employment conditions (job regularity and wage levels). Overall, 
the results support the assumption that export growth contributes to greater employment opportunities 
for (mostly unskilled) irregular workers in lower-income DCs and (more skilled than unskilled) 
regular workers in higher-income DCs. 
 
 
 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
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Exports and inequality reduction 
With regard to the hypothesis, the results of multiple imputations using the FE model with an LDV are 
presented in Table 5. Three models were run for each of three samples: all DCs (Models 1 through 3), 
higher-income DCs (Models 4 through 6), and lower-income DCs (Models 7 through 9). Among the 
independent variables, estimation was inconsistent for the young population, the elderly population, 
and inflation for different models within the same sample. The square of the logarithm of per capita 
GDP, although consistently of the expected sign, was not statistically significant for any model. 
Therefore, these four variables were dropped from the final models and are not reflected in the results 
section.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The export/GDP ratio had no significant effect on income inequality for higher-income DCs 
(Models 4 and 6) but a significantly negative effect for lower-income DCs (Models 7 and 9). For 
lower-income DCs, the effect of exports was weaker when the net inflow of FDI was included in the 
model (Model 9), but it was still significant at the 0.1 level. These results are consistent with our 
hypothesis that an increase in the export share of GDP reduces income inequality in lower-income 
DCs but not higher-income DCs. It is possible that the content of the exports matters. An increase in 
mineral exports, for example, may shift income distribution toward more inequality because it is likely 
to concentrate export revenues within a capital-intensive industry rather than generate jobs for 
unskilled workers. 10  To check this possibility, first, exports were divided into mineral and 
non-mineral exports, which were tested separately in the above models. Second, the impact of exports 
was tested using subsamples with high and low mineral export ratios. These alternative specifications, 
however, did not yield statistically significant results.  
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  Regarding other findings, FDI displayed the expected effect for lower-income DCs but no 
significant effect for higher-income DCs. Since FDI flight, which has often happened in 
higher-income DCs, affects the lower-income earners and unskilled workers more severely than it 
does higher-income and skilled workers (Dong 2014, 253-258), both highly positive and highly 
negative levels of net inward FDI might increase income inequality in higher-income DCs. Imports 
had the expected negative sign for five of the six models, but was not statistically significant for any 
model. 
Sociodemographic variables also present interesting contrasts between higher- and lower-income 
DCs, although only one (urban population) was statistically significant for one model. The coefficient 
for the secondary school enrollment ratio, for example, was positive for higher-income DCs and 
negative for lower-income DCs, suggesting that when the level of education is already high, further 
advances in education benefit the rich rather than the poor. Since secondary education helps to provide 
skilled labor, this finding gives support to the skill premium model for higher-income DCs. The 
coefficient for the urban population rate was negative for higher-income DCs and positive for 
lower-income DCs. In predominantly rural lower-income DCs, internal migration apparently 
aggravates the urban–rural disparity; in urbanized higher-income DCs, the absorption of the rural 
population into cities helps to deplete the sources of surplus labor.  
 
Conclusion 
Analysis revealed that an increase in the export/GDP ratio enhances employment opportunities for 
(mostly unskilled) irregular workers in lower-income DCs and (more skilled than unskilled) regular 
workers in higher-income DCs. Because of these divergent impacts of export growth on job creation, 
a greater export/GDP ratio reduces income inequality for lower-income DCs but has no significant 
effect for higher-income DCs. This is because expanded job opportunities for mostly unskilled 
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workers in lower-income DCs raise the income level of the poorer group of the population whereas 
improved employment conditions for substantially skilled workers in higher-income DCs drive up 
the skill premium and increase inequality. In other words, the Stolper–Samuelson effect is more 
congruous with lower-income than higher-income DCs. Also, there was a strong finding that net 
inflow of FDI widens income inequality in lower-income DCs but not in higher-income DCs. This 
discrepancy might be attributed to the suggested U-curve effect of FDI on income inequality in 
higher-income DCs that have repeatedly suffered from economic crises. This implies that both 
high-level capital inflows and massive capital outflows following economic crises can exacerbate 
income inequality. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                        
 
1 Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004) also point out that Asian countries that liberalized trade 
when unskilled labor was still abundant reduced income inequality whereas in Latin America trade 
liberalization after labor skill intensification did not promote equality.  
2 The year 2010 was used because it has the largest set of cross-country observations in the dataset. 
The level of 25,000 US dollars was chosen for the sample so as to exclude the 15 original member 
countries of the European Union. 
3 The research design section draws on Kawanaka and Hazama (2016, 79-82). 
4 Baltagi (2008) also shows that a RE model may be erroneously rejected by the Hausman test when 
endogeneity is present and that a two-stage least-squares RE model is a better alternative in such 
circumstances. 
5 The robustness check for endogeneity using the Blundell and Bond System generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimator was initially considered. It is a superior extension of the Arellano and 
Bond GMM estimator, especially when the number of time points is low (Baltagi 2008, 160–162). 
However, using the SWIID for model estimation requires multiple imputations to incorporate into an 
analysis the standard errors for SWIID estimates. In STATA, multiple imputations are possible only 
for FE or RE models, not for GMM estimators. 
6 Similarly, Angrist and Pischke (2009, 243-6) recommends adopting the FE and LDV models, 
respectively, to obtain the upper and lower bounds of the estimates (Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
7 Kuznets (1955) suggested that economic growth initially increases inequality much more in 
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developing than developed countries because the dearth of the middle class in the former results in 
wealth concentrating in the hands of the rich.  
8 See the detail for unemployment statistics in 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS. 
9 It is the inverse of the mean income difference between the agricultural and nonagricultural 
sectors. 
10 The author owes this insight to Shin-ichi Takeuchi. 
  
15 
 
 
Figure 1. Lorenz Curves: Before and after Export Growth 
 
Note: Hypothetical Lorenz curves before and after an increase in exports’ share of the GDP. Area A 
represents the reduction in income inequality caused by job creation, and Area B represents the 
increase in income inequality caused by higher wages for skilled labor 
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Table 1 Sample of Countries (N=106) 
 
    
Lower-income countries (n = 70) Higher-income countries (n = 36) 
  Albania Argentina 
Algeria Azerbaijan 
Angola Belarus 
Armenia Botswana 
Bangladesh Brazil 
Benin Bulgaria 
Bolivia Chile 
Burkina Faso Colombia 
Burundi Costa Rica 
Cambodia Croatia 
Cameroon Czech Republic 
Cape Verde Dominican Republic 
Central African Republic Estonia 
Chad Gabon 
China Hungary 
Comoros Kazakhstan 
Cote d'Ivoire Korea, South 
Ecuador Latvia 
Egypt Lebanon 
El Salvador Lithuania 
Ethiopia Malaysia 
Gambia Mauritius 
Georgia Mexico 
Ghana Panama 
Guatemala Peru 
Guinea Poland 
Guinea-Bissau Portugal 
Guyana Romania 
Honduras Russia 
India Slovenia 
Indonesia South Africa 
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Jamaica Suriname 
Jordan Trinidad and Tobago 
Kenya Turkey 
Kyrgyzstan Uruguay 
Lesotho Venezuela 
Macedonia 
 Madagascar 
 Malawi 
 Mali 
 Mauritania 
 Mongolia 
 Morocco 
 Mozambique 
 Namibia 
 Nepal 
 Nicaragua 
 Niger 
 Nigeria 
 Pakistan 
 Papua New Guinea 
 Paraguay 
 Philippines 
 Rwanda 
 Senegal 
 Sierra Leone 
 Sri Lanka 
 Sudan 
 Swaziland 
 Syria 
 Thailand 
 Togo 
 Tunisia 
 Uganda 
 Ukraine 
 Uzbekistan 
 Vietnam 
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Yemen 
 Zambia 
 Zimbabwe  
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Table 2. Variables and Data Sources 
 
Variable name Source 
Gini net (Gini after tax) Solt 2009 
GDP per capita logged, constant USD World Bank 
GDP per capita logged, current USD World Bank 
Inflation (%) World Bank 
Secondary school enrollment ratio (%) World Bank 
Urban population (% of total) World Bank 
Ratio of exports to GDP World Bank 
Ratio of imports to GDP World Bank 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) World Bank 
Unemployment (% of total labor force) World Bank 
Labor force in agriculture (% of total labor force) World Bank 
Agriculture as a share of GDP World Bank 
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Table 3. Testing the Effect of Exports on Unemployment 
 
                
 
Income groups defined by GDP per capita $ in 2010  
 
5000 ≦ Higher income <  25000 
 
Lower income < 5000 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        L.Unemployment total (% of total labor force) 0.840*** 0.827*** 0.838*** 
 
0.717*** 0.699*** 0.697*** 
 
(0.0274) (0.0277) (0.0273) 
 
(0.0381) (0.0361) (0.0378) 
        L.GDP per capita logged, constant US$ 1.005* 0.948* 0.994* 
 
0.872 0.652 0.689 
(0.567) (0.575) (0.565) 
 
(0.556) (0.567) (0.575) 
        L.School enrollment_secondary 0.0257** 0.0320*** 0.0235** 
 
0.00359 0.0105 0.00690 
 
(0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0104) 
 
(0.0172) (0.0168) (0.0172) 
        L.Urban popuration (% of total) 0.00520 -0.0228 -0.00806 
 
-0.0411 -0.0141 -0.0207 
 
(0.0291) (0.0299) (0.0295) 
 
(0.0420) (0.0415) (0.0422) 
        L.Exports (% of GDP) -0.0658*** 
 
-0.0692*** 
 
-0.0151 
 
-0.0104 
 
(0.0146) 
 
(0.0146) 
 
(0.0198) 
 
(0.0197) 
        L.Imports (% of GDP) 0.0412** 
 
0.0442*** 
 
0.0267 
 
0.0262 
 
(0.0170) 
 
(0.0170) 
 
(0.0181) 
 
(0.0180) 
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L.Foreign direct investment  
-0.161* -0.202** 
  
-0.131 -0.145* 
 
(0.0870) (0.0856) 
  
(0.0822) (0.0836) 
        Constant -7.383 -6.430 -6.634 
 
-2.293 -1.556 -2.079 
 
(4.911) (5.008) (4.900) 
 
(3.721) (3.868) (3.966) 
        Observations 599 599 599 
 
388 391 384 
        R-squared 0.731 0.721 0.734 
 
0.596 0.605 0.600 
                
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; and ***: p < 0.01. 
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Table 4. Testing the Effect of Exports on Underemployment 
 
                
 
Income groups defined by GDP per capita $ in 2010  
 
5000 ≦ Higher income <  25000 
 
Lower income < 5000 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        L.Sector dualism (|emp_agr - gdp_agr|) 0.786*** 0.745*** 0.730*** 
 
0.679*** 0.681*** 0.670*** 
 
(0.0265) (0.0247) (0.0273) 
 
(0.0384) (0.0394) (0.0398) 
        L.GDP per capita logged, constant US$ -0.705 -0.577 -0.674 
 
1.737* 1.594 1.805* 
(0.552) (0.536) (0.545) 
 
(0.918) (0.973) (0.983) 
        L.School enrollment_secondary -0.00295 0.0126 0.0125 
 
-0.0640** -0.0751** -0.0687** 
 
(0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0110) 
 
(0.0292) (0.0308) (0.0309) 
        L.Urban population (% of total) -0.0275 -0.00144 -0.00821 
 
-0.118* -0.116* -0.120* 
 
(0.0329) (0.0336) (0.0340) 
 
(0.0690) (0.0703) (0.0702) 
        L.Exports (% of GDP) 0.00347 
 
0.0179 
 
-0.100*** 
 
-0.0944** 
 
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0156) 
 
(0.0385) 
 
(0.0392) 
        L.Imports (% of GDP) -0.0230 
 
-0.0216 
 
0.0554* 
 
0.0439 
 
(0.0162) 
 
(0.0167) 
 
(0.0322) 
 
(0.0345) 
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L.Foreign direct investement  
0.0481 0.0653 
  
0.227 0.205 
 
(0.0830) (0.0842) 
  
(0.194) (0.210) 
        Constant 10.29** 6.878 8.575* 
 
4.924 5.087 5.131 
 
(4.738) (4.676) (4.862) 
 
(6.531) (6.812) (7.030) 
 
       
Observations 593 570 570 
 
358 358 355 
        R-squared  0.760 0.751 0.752   0.719 0.712 0.719 
        
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *: p < 0.10; ** p: < 0.05; and *** p: < 0.01. 
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Table 5. Estimation of Effects of Exports on Income Inequality 
 
                        
 
Income groups defined by GDP per capita $ in 2010  
 
All < 25000 
 
5000 ≦ Higher income <  25000 
 
Lower income < 5000 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) 
            L.Gini_net 0.896*** 0.903*** 0.901*** 
 
0.879*** 0.881*** 0.876*** 
 
0.891*** 0.902*** 0.900*** 
 
(0.0149) (0.0143) (0.0146) 
 
(0.0251) (0.0234) (0.0245) 
 
(0.0207) (0.0196) (0.0203) 
            
L.GDP per capita logged 
1.263*** 1.180*** 1.258*** 
 
0.371 0.494 0.469 
 
1.980*** 1.915*** 2.123*** 
(0.319) (0.324) (0.330) 
 
(0.366) (0.365) (0.362) 
 
(0.531) (0.601) (0.616) 
            L.School enrollment_secondary -0.00237 0.00362 0.00294 
 
0.00530 0.0113 0.0124 
 
-0.0162 -0.0191 -0.0182 
 
(0.00855) (0.00901) (0.00906) 
 
(0.00866) (0.00883) (0.00873) 
 
(0.0153) (0.0171) (0.0172) 
            L.Urban population -0.0258 -0.0211 -0.0166 
 
-0.0413* -0.0382 -0.0371 
 
0.0137 0.00910 0.0194 
 
(0.0215) (0.0219) (0.0222) 
 
(0.0234) (0.0237) (0.0240) 
 
(0.0401) (0.0420) (0.0422) 
            L.Exports -0.0232** 
 
-0.0137 
 
-0.0119 
 
-0.00722 
 
-0.0367** 
 
-0.0282* 
 
(0.00992) 
 
(0.0102) 
 
(0.0127) 
 
(0.0129) 
 
(0.0155) 
 
(0.0158) 
            L.Imports 0.0115 
 
0.000986 
 
0.0119 
 
0.0122 
 
0.0119 
 
-0.00406 
 
(0.00991) 
 
(0.0104) 
 
(0.0148) 
 
(0.0162) 
 
(0.0135) 
 
(0.0140) 
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            L.Foreign direct investment 
 
0.0331** 0.0320** 
  
-0.00433 -0.00797 
  
0.0462*** 0.0463** 
 
(0.0129) (0.0136) 
  
(0.0151) (0.0157) 
  
(0.0169) (0.0180) 
            Constant -3.476 -3.777 -4.104 
 
1.792 0.337 0.418 
 
-8.438** -9.145** -10.16** 
 
(2.742) (3.052) (3.083) 
 
(3.903) (3.777) (3.810) 
 
(3.986) (3.946) (4.011) 
            Observations 1823 1770 1756 
 
790 761 755 
 
1033 1009 1001 
                        
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; and ***: p < 0.01. 
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